Purpose -According to Putnam, civic engagement fosters a cooperative structure and generalized trust. This leads to accumulation of social capital, in the form of inclusive, cooperative networks that are economically productive. The aim of this paper is to evaluate critically this thesis. Design/methodology/approach -Drawing upon data from rural Denmark, this paper double tests Putnam's somewhat simplistic model of social capital leading to higher levels of economic performance. Findings -In test one, which is based on statistical data, it is found that social capital measured as the density of voluntary associations does not in any way influence levels of economic performance. Test two, based on qualitative fieldwork, points at the socioeconomic power of social capital, implying many positive and negative outcomes other than the sheer economic. Research limitations/implications -Data are only from Denmark. Practical implications -This paper reframes the social capital research agenda, displaying to policy makers that they should not overestimate the blessing of voluntary associations. Originality/value -This paper contributes to the sociological critique of the one-sided, positive picture of civic associations.
Introduction
Social capital has become a popular concept within the social sciences, covering vital areas of research within economy (Dasgupta, 2000; Sobel, 2002) , political science (Woolcock, 1998; Fukuyama, 2001) , and sociology (Coleman, 1990; Portes, 1998) . Also the contributions within rural studies have been significant. These include reviews and theory development (Flora, 1998; Warner, 1999; Castle, 2002) , community development studies (Hofferth and Iceland, 1998; Falk and Kilpatrick, 2000; DeFillippis, 2001) , statistical surveys (Narayan and Pritchett, 2000; Callois and Angeon, 2004) , and historical case studies (Schulman and Anderson, 1999; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2000) .
Being an even more intangible capital than human capital, ''social capital'' challenges mathematical formalism within a contemporary economics that is reluctant to recognize intangibles on the same footing as tangibles -by Tomer (2002, p. 421) called ''mainstream theory's most notable failure''. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium we are still far from having included ''all capital'' in our analyses, as Schultz (1971, p. 9) once prophesized.
By focusing on relations of trust as a ''lubricator'' for society, social capital research arguably succeeds in combining the ''troika'' of neoclassical, Smithsonian markets, and transaction costs with political scientists' institutions and sociologists' norms (Anheier and Kendall, 2002; Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003) .
Since the beginning of the 1990s, one of the most influential social capital researchers has been American political scientist Robert D. Putnam. In his definition, IJSSP 26,9/10
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Putnam has aimed to link the notion of trust to civil society. Thus, Putnam (1993, p. 167) has defined social capital as ''features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions''. Putnam's vision of social capital as almost visible and tangible ''stocks'' is revealed both in Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993) and Bowling Alone (Putnam, 2000) , however, somewhat modified in his most recent book, Better Together (Putnam and Feldstein, 2004) . In the two former works, the main purpose is to apply statistics in order to measure social capital in a geographical area over time. Here he equates increase in civic engagement with increase in social capital; whereas decline in social capital is associated with decline in civic engagement. Thus, in Making Democracy Work, which is a study of the civic engaged Northern Italy and the corrupt Southern Italy, Putnam concludes that the northern Italian communities ''did not become civic simply because they were rich. The historical record strongly suggests precisely the opposite: They have become rich because they were civic. The social capital embodied in norms and networks of civic engagement seems to be a precondition for economic development, as well as for effective government'' (Putnam, 1993, p. 379 ).
So we see that, for Putnam, democratization processes and successful social capital building primarily take place due to the political history of a population, in the form of a legacy of democratic traditions of widespread co-operation and trust behavior. Here, Putnam uses the density of voluntary organizations as the most important measure of social capital. This thesis has been broadly accepted within the social sciences, and Putnam's methodology has been copied in a large number of civic engagement research projects, including World Bank projects (e.g. Dasgupta, 2000; Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002) . However, the rapidly expanding literature on the supposed relation between density of voluntary associations and economic performance has largely failed to document the assumed blessings of these associations. Therefore, using a Danish case, we want to submit the ''lex Putnamiensis'' to a double test that includes both macro and micro levels, in order to find out what is reality and what is myth.
In the first test, which is based on statistical data, we find that social capital measured as the density of voluntary associations does not in any way influence levels of economic performance. The second test, based on fieldwork, reveals the socioeconomic power of social capital, implying many positive and negative outcomes other than sheer economic.
After discussing Putnam's argument in section 2, we present our Danish case. First, section 3 presents statistical data on association density and economic performance in a sample of Danish rural municipalities. Then section 4 compares these results with results from recent, qualitative research (fieldwork) done by one of the authors in Rural Denmark.
2. Discussing Putnam's argument 2.1. Measuring invisible forms of capital Social capital research should be seen as a methodological revolution, primarily, where former ''non-economic'' resources are being included on the same footing with more visible, economic assets. Thus, like all other capitals social capital can be seen as both convertible to other forms of capital and cumulative . Social capital is an invisible form of capital, but arguably involving visible effects.
Such a neocapital approach has recently become popular within behavioral economics and economic sociology (e.g. Portes, 1998; Sobel, 2002; Tomer, 2003; Light, 2004) . Unfortunately, however, at the risk of overflowing the literature with a myriad of Socioeconomic power of social capital 413 more or less exotic forms of capitals, ranging from religious to digital capitals. However, unchained from its previous, rather dogmatic Marxist framework a new capital approach opens for the possibility of measuring stocks of visible as well as invisible forms of capital at the same level in the analysis, as Bourdieu (1979 Bourdieu ( , 1986 early envisioned.
Here, social capital appears as a particular interesting capital. Thus, paraphrasing Coleman, we are dealing with a capital outside things and people, in the borderland between wholly tangibles such as physical and economic capital and non-tangibles such as human and cultural capital within human beings. Intangible capital exists, as Veblen (1908) early stated, and social capital should arguably be seen as a production factor in line with traditional capitals -namely as the individual and collective ''capitalization'' of networks of trust, which ultimately can be converted into economic capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1986 ; see also Lin, 1999; Herreros, 2004) .
Furthermore, current social capital research opens for the possibility of distinguishing between prevailingly positive and negative social capital, even though no one has succeeded in doing this in any direct way (but only via indicators or ''proxies'', cf. Putnam, 1993 Putnam, , 2000 . Strongly inspired by Bourdieu, sociologist Portes (1998, p. 10) has defined positive social capital as a real, potential resource available for concrete individuals -implying positive socioeconomic outcomes from ''rule enforcement'' and ''bounded solidarity''. However, social capital can also be negative, entailing enforceable trust harmful to society (even though beneficial to the group). Empirical examples of prevailingly positive social capital are the Vietnamese community in New Orleans, where everyone keeps an eye on one another, preventing a child being truanting from school or joining a street gang; and Asiatic immigrant mothers in the USA, who not only remain at home with their children, but also procure school textbooks in order to help their children with their homework (Portes, 1998, p. 11 ). An example of prevailingly negative social capital, which implies a binding and forced solidarity, is Puerto Rican drug dealers in New York, who do everything to keep one another within the drug milieu, to the extent that it would be treason to mix with the whites in an attempt at social upward mobility (Portes, 1998, p. 17) . Thus, Portes states, social capital cuts ''both ways'', in that ''social ties can bring about greater control over wayward behavior and provide privileged access to resources [or] restrict individual freedoms, and bar outsiders from gaining access to the same resources through particularistic preferences'' (Portes, 1998, p. 21 ; see also Portes, 2000; Portes and Landolt, 1996) .
The opening towards possible measurement of social capital resources should be seen as a clear concession to economists, who exactly from this reason have recognized social capital as a new form of capital (e.g. Dasgupta, 2000; Spellerberg, 2001; Robison et al., 2002; Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003) . Furthermore, fostering in itself bridging social capital within the human sciences (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004, p. 3) the concept of social capital has also invited to new explorations within e.g. network theory (Lin, 1999) , common resource management (Ostrom, 1994) and game theory (Herreros, 2004) .
Not least the distinction between open networks of an including and networks of a ''superglued'' excluding nature -that is, bridging and (excessively) bonding types of social capital (Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2000) -has made it easier for economists to operationalize and quantify the two types of capital as either positive or negative externalities, with all the risks of reductionism this involves (e.g. Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003 (Putnam, 2000, p. 22 ). An example of beneficial bridging social capital could be the social interaction in a sports club where you get to know people. This regular face-to-face interaction in the sports club facilitates inclusive networks and thus contributes to bridge between different social groups, leading to social trust in a good circle. Excessive bonding social capital can be found, for example, within certain religious networks. For example, Putnam (2000, p. 410) mentions that ''proselytizing religions are better at creating bonding social capital than bridging social capital, and tolerance of unbelievers is not a virtue notably associated with fundamentalism'' (Putnam, 2000, p. 410) . However, as Portes has convincingly argued, we find negative and positive types of social capital in every society, and even as two qualities within the same network (Portes, 1998, p. 20) . In sum, we are talking about highly complex and ''un-pure'' mixes of bridging/bonding -a challenge, which indeed calls for both quantitative and qualitative measurement.
Associations and trust
As we mentioned, Putnam's social capital argument has been criticized for being tautological and indiscriminate -reflecting, as it were, the biblical word:'' For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance. But whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath'' (Matthew's Gospel 13, 12). Thus, in Making Democracy Work the North is ''given everything'' due to an initial civic life friendly, political set-up leading to social trust and economic growth, while everything is ''taken away'' from the South because of an initial despotic Normannic rule that has fostered distrust, corruption, and economic backlash in a vicious circle:
In the North, norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement have been embodied in tower societies, guilds, mutual aid societies, cooperatives, unions, and even soccer clubs and literary societies. These horizontal civic bonds have undergirded levels of economic and institutional performance generally much higher than in the South, where social and political relations have been vertically structured (Putnam, 1993, p. 181). More recent outcomes of such path dependencies, Putnam argues further, can be statistically documented for North and South in correlations between four key indicators: Electoral turnouts, referendum turnouts, newspaper readership, and scarcity of sports and cultural associations (Putnam, 1993, p. 96) . Thus, the learning from the Italian case becomes that ''voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement''.
There is in fact good reason why the density of voluntary civic associations within a certain area should be used as an important proxy [1] . As the formation of civic movements in 19th century Europe and USA suggest, this organizational form seems to enhance particularized as well as generalized trust, thus ''lubricating'' human cooperation and leading to higher economic performance.
For example, in rural Denmark a broad tradition of civic organization was established during the 19th century, led by energetic, entrepreneurial, and idealistic peasants. From about 1810 and onwards, this organization gradually institutionalized in a myriad of associations, so numerous in the last part of the century that the period Socioeconomic power of social capital 415 was known as Foreningstiden, ''the era of associations'' . This involved major civic movements and wide-scale voluntary provision of private goods in the first part of the century (mainly assurance via self-organized assurance associations), and collective, non-excludable goods in the second half (mainly due to agricultural cooperative associations). Thus strongly bridging social capital was built, motivating different social groups to cooperate across political and religious cleavages. Social capital, first strictly instrumental and used in narrow self-interest gave rise to more social capital, beneficial for the whole society, in what Herreros (2004, p. 100) has termed the ''virtuous circle of the creation of social capital'' -however, without state involvement in this case.
Such economically and culturally fruitful, civic enthusiasm we find in other Western countries at that time. As already mentioned, also in the USA a rich civic life developed in this period, reaching a peak during 1850 -1900 (Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999 Putnam, 2000) . Likewise, the associational 19th century gave rise to strong civic movements in the CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries), most importantly cooperative movements. This is not least the case in Poland where both urban and peasant voluntary cooperatives flourished until the communist take-over in 1948. After that time the cooperatives were transformed into state cooperatives. In this way, voluntary network cooperation and general trust was practically destroyed within a decade or so Maliszewski, 1995) .
Thus, we do not doubt that open network cooperation, informal or in formal, voluntary associations -involving collective as well as private good provision and enhanced by democratic political systems -can lead to trust and ''lubrication'' of highly productive, cooperative relations. Nor that such a form of intangible capital has traditionally constituted a comparative advantage in many rural areas all over the world (Castle, 2002, p. 342) . We do, however, doubt the optimistic-economistic picture of voluntary associations. Are they always immediately capitalizable? Or do they provide us with other, more invisible and less measurable benefits as well?
As mentioned, existing literature is not clear here. Presumably, one may add, because all forms of capital have not been included in the analyses. For example, using recent World Value Surveys Herreros (2004) -who argues that associational life does indeed lead to social capital and material wealth -has tested a sample of 12 countries, including the ''social capitalist'' Scandinavian countries. He finds that social trust is positively correlated with church attendance, education, and incomes level but not membership of associations: ''The main variable for social capitalist is also significant, but in the opposite direction to that expected: membership of associations is linked to lower levels of social trust'' (Herreros, 2004, p. 83) . And in an estimation of the impact of membership of associations on the probability of social trust, taken from the Barometer of Andalusian Public Opinion of 2000, he concludes that members of three associations are most probable to trust people they do not know. Hence, trust seems to reach its peak among members of three associations, while it is lower among members of both one or two associations and members of four or more associations (Herreros, 2004, p. 63) . How can this be? How do we explain that?
Furthermore, in the USA several investigations have been undertaken, Putnam's Bowling Alone being the most extensive. For example, in a comparative analysis of American counties Rupasingha et al. (2002) find that the density of associations has a positive impact on economic growth, that is, in line with Putnam's results. Likewise, in a study of the French départements Combes et al. (2002) find positive correlations between the density of personal and economic networks and regional economic performance, and Narayan and Pritchett (2000) reach the same result for a sample of Tanzanian villages. In contrast, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) conclude in their cross-country surveys that association densities do not have significant impact on economic performance and investment: Putnam [1993] has suggested that dense horizontal networks reinforce trust and civic norms. However, we find that horizontal networks -as measured by membership in groups -are unrelated to trust and civic norms (. . .) and to economic performance Keefer, 1997, p. 1284) .
At a more overall, theoretical level, Portes (2000) laments the semantic slide of social capital from denoting concrete resources belonging to an individual (Bourdieu) or a family (Coleman) to abstract, collective ''stocks'' of social capital belonging to whole regions or states (Putnam) . In the latter case, Portes argues, we risk to overload the concept by transforming it into a (circular) argument per se, without any clear empirical evidence.
Let us now take a look at associations in Denmark. Together with other Scandinavian welfare societies such as Sweden, Norway, and Finland, Denmark is often found in the lead of social trust indexes, and it is not seldom pointed out as the ideal social capitalist country -rich on civic associations, which (it is presumed) function as a motor for economic performance. However, as Callois and Angeon (2004, p. 11) observe, there can be ''many different kinds of associations, some of which may have little or nothing to do with economic development''; and, furthermore, associations can have ''both positive (promoting civic action) and negative (promoting particular interests) effects''.
Test 1: associations and economic performance in Denmark
To reiterate, Putnam's argument bases on the hypothesis that a high number of voluntary civic associations correlate with high levels of political and economic performance. This is one of Putnam's most important tools to show significant differences between North and South Italy and ''progressive'' and ''reactionary'' states in the USA. Likewise, we have applied the association density as a proxy of social capital in Denmark, focusing on the linkage between numbers of associations within an area and economic performance.
The data
As we mentioned, Denmark has a high score in international social trust indexes. A Putnamian standard hypothesis would be that this is due to a vibrant Danish civic society and a country swelling with voluntary associations securing common goods such as social trust, democracy, self-monitoring, and widespread cooperation.
In fact, Denmark and the other Scandinavian countries are said to have higher densities of voluntary civic associations than in e.g. southern European countries. However, until now this has not been clearly documented due to lack of data that can be used in cross-national comparisons (Torpe and Kjeldgaard, 2003, p. 18) . Likewise, it is a widespread assumption that rural Denmark in particular is rich on voluntary associations, thanks to the aforementioned rural civic traditions that can be traced back to a 19th century ''Era of associations''. However, only one study indicates that this is also the case today, by showing that a sample of Danish rural municipalities has a higher density of associations than a sample of Danish urban municipalities (Ibsen, 1994) .
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Previous studies of association densities in Denmark draw on data collected from telephone books, local informants, municipal records, and other available sources at the spot (Torpe and Kjeldgaard, 2003; Nielsen and Thuesen, 2002; Ibsen, 1994) . First of all, this involves a lot of time-consuming work, why only small samples of minor areas have been analyzed so far. A second important point is that the estimated association densities in various areas are not fully comparable, due to significant variations in data accessibility and quality.
In Denmark, an association is required to register in the National Central Business Register (det Centrale Virksomhedsregister, or CVR), if it is has an annual turnover that exceeds 50,000 DKK, or if it pays out more than 1,500 DKK per year to employees or other persons (Told & Skat, 2004, Section D.11.22; Told & Skat, 2003, p. 60) . The CVR register has been accessible to us through a database owned and administered by a private organization [2] . The CVR register only contains data for presently registered businesses and institutions. Thus, the data can be used for cross-sectional analyses, but not for longitudinal analyses because of the lack of historic data. First, by use of the database we found the number of active associations in various geographical areas throughout the country. Next, we estimated the association densities by relating the total number of associations to the total number of inhabitants in these areas. It was possible for us to find the number of associations in all Danish municipalities (269 municipalities in total in 2005), as well as distributed over different types of municipalities (peripheral/urban).
Our method has two major advantages. First, the inclusion rules provide a common definition of the term association in the form of certain minimum features. Data quality and accessibility are therefore the same for all regions. This means that calculated association densities in different geographical areas are fully comparable. Second, the database allows an electronic count of the number of associations in regions of any size. As mentioned, previous studies had to concentrate on minor study areas due to the time-consuming method of counting associations through telephone books, home pages, and personal interviews.
One disadvantage is that many associations do not meet the registration requirements of the CVR register and are thus not registered. In a comparative study between geographical areas, this is only a problem if the number of registered associations does not reflect the total number of associations. To evaluate the extent of omitted associations, we have collected data from various local data sources in four smaller sample areas at parish level.
As can be seen in Table I , out of all identified associations, the ones registered in the database account for 31-42 per cent. This is a relatively narrow span keeping in mind that there are differences in how detailed information is reported in sources like home pages, telephone books, and local informants across the sample areas. Any differences in how well registered associations represent all associations at parish level are likely to be evened out at the municipality level, which shall be used in the following analyses. Thus, for the purpose of this study, we assume that the registered association is a valid proxy for the total number of associations across the study areas. Table II shows various estimations of association density in Denmark, at various levels. As can be seen, we find in Denmark a national average of 79 associations per 10,000 inhabitants, while the association density in Danish peripheral municipalities is IJSSP 26,9/10 418 only 71. Note that peripheral municipalities are defined as the most peripheral and rural municipalities in Denmark [3] .
Density of associations
Hence, the computed association densities seem to reject the truism, or myth, that there are more associations in the Danish countryside than in other areas, e.g. in urban areas. One explanation is that averages in urban areas are increased by a significant number of nation-wide associations, such as political parties, employers' associations, trade unions, NGOs, charitable organizations etc. The head quarters and main activities tend to be located in urban areas, and this is mainly the reason why the four municipalities, which contain the four largest cities in Denmark, have very high association densities (see Table II ).
However, it does not seem reasonable to compare peripheral municipalities with a national average that includes these four urban municipalities, which clearly have an overrepresentation of large, nation-wide associations with members from all over the country. Therefore, we have subtracted these four municipalities (Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Odense, Aarhus) and compared the number with the peripheral municipalities. As Table II indicates, we thus reach the opposite result, namely that peripheral municipalities have a higher association density than the rest of the country: 71 vs 66 associations per 10,000 inhabitants.
Association density and economic performance
So we see that the popular opinion of the richness of associational life in the countryside is not fully misplaced. We do find a little more associations here when numbers from four city municipalities are subtracted. Another question is: which relation do we find between association density and economic performance? Again, we want to compare apples with apples. Therefore, we have chosen only to analyze numbers among the sample of peripheral rural municipalities. In order to estimate economic performance, we have used two measures: Gross income per inhabitant and rate of unemployment.
Data for the 30 Danish peripheral municipalities in 2002 are shown in Table III . Table III shows rather large variations among the 30 peripheral municipalities, both in respect to association density, income level, and percentage of unemployed.
In Figure 1 , we have plotted the numbers of association density and gross income per inhabitant in 30 peripheral municipalities. It is interesting to see that association Figure 1 .
The relation between association density and income level in the 30 peripheral municipalities in Denmark, 2002 density and economic performance are not positively related. Rather, we see an independent relation, with a slight tendency to a negative relation. But what about association density and unemployment? Figure 2 shows association densities and unemployment rates in peripheral rural Denmark. As can be seen, neither this measure indicates a positive relation between a high association density and economic success.
Finally, Table IV below lists results from a regression estimated on our two sets of data (presented in Figures 1 and 2) . The value expresses the slope of the line, around which the dots can best be distributed.
The value for the regression between association densities and income levels is negative, pointing to a negative relationship between association densities and income levels. This negative relationship is not significant using the normal significance level of 0.05. The value for the regression between association densities and the unemployment rates is also negative. Since low unemployment rates are desirable, this indicates a positive relation between association density and this economic success indicator. However, the value is highly insignificant ( p ¼ 0.94, meaning that there is a 94 per cent probability that the found relationship is a statistical coincidence).
Hence, association densities do not influence the levels of economic performance in our sample in one way or the other. In other words, the data provides no evidence that 
Test 2: fieldwork
As we mentioned, rural Denmark is widely known for its many civic movements, not least the cooperative movements. Arguably, positive, bridging types of social capital in the form of network cooperation based on trust and regular face-to-face contact have been built within such democratic associations since the middle of the 19th century, enhancing not only economic performance, but also educational levels and political influence Svendsen, 2001, 2004) . However, such (direct) capitalization of social capital might not take place today. This will become clear in the following, where we do not attempt to present a systematic and thoroughgoing fieldwork study, but rather some glimpses of typical associational life in peripheral rural Denmark around the new millennium.
Small, leisure-time communities
First of all, recent fieldwork studies reveal that there are still civic enthusiasts among the rural population. The large majority of these so-called dedicated souls (ildsjaele, literally: ''souls of fire'') are engaged in cultural associations -partly in contrast to the economic entrepreneurs, who dominated in the local cooperative associations until the 1960s . During the last ten years or so, such dedicated souls have been the organizers of a wide range of cultural activities, including a large number of combined cultural-sports halls. These are raised in order to ''foster local solidarity'', to ''have a common meeting-place'', or -as is also a typical statement -to avoid traveling to nearby urban centers in order to participate in cultural or sports activities (Busck et al., 2004) . Moreover, the general pattern is that voluntary provision of collective goods by dedicated souls prevails in small, outskirt communities, where local people for long have been forced to manage themselves (Busck et al., 2004) . For example, in an interview made by one of the authors with a municipality director in the municipality of Thyholm the respondent explained that: dedicated souls [ildsjaele] in local communities in the most marginal parts of the municipality have been used to fight to establish things. . . because it didn't happen just by itself. While in the urban centre in such a small municipality [Thyholm] . . . there things are provided on a sofa.
A good example is the establishment of a sports hall in the outskirt village of Skarrild, Kibaek municipality, in the middle of peninsular Jutland -the homestead of a rich associational life. This project involved a large number of the local population. It was initiated by a workshop open for all citizens, and which -according to a member of the steering board -brought about so many ideas that they would have sufficed ''to build a whole city'' (Busck et al., 2004, p. 58) . The building was finished in January 2004, thanks to ''oceans of voluntary work''. In fact, 97 volunteers were registered on a work list copied to fieldworker, including a craftman's team, a building and excavation team, a cleaning team, and a team doing the accounts. As the main entrepreneurs assured the fieldworker (one of the authors) again and again, the realization of this place ''for all to gather'' happened despite the local politicians in the municipality center of Kibaek, who were said to prefer subsidizing activities in their own town. For example, an energetic female member of the steering committee, who called herself ''the optimist in the whole business'', stressed the participants' ability to ''support each other'' and ''work together'' -also in the many burdensome periods of crisis, disappointments, and hardships due to the opposition from the side of the municipality, all of which involved serious private costs (depressions, distrust in politicians, quarrels with spouse, no time for the kids etc.). And she further explained:
All the time the question has been: How do we raise more money? How do we get things on the table . . . some plans [for the sports hall building] on the table. And then we have fought incredibly much with the Municipality all the time (. . .) It has been a hard hard hard struggle! (. . .) When then, at last, we started to collect money [in Skarrild parish], we collected a whole million (. . .) People had only promised [in advance] to give 600.000. When we went out collecting, we got a whole million. Because now it had become reality, then people wanted to give.
And she continued to explain in detail how she and other dedicated souls (mostly activated by her) had collected money in many other, much more exotic ways, such as organizing a ''ladies' party'' and a ''gentlemen's party''. Thus, the final result was a collection of 2.5 million DKK in total in the local area, which was supplemented with 1.2 million DKK in external funding due to energetic fundraising (Busck et al., 2004, p. 58) . And, finally, the budget would balance [4] .
Note that Skarrild is not an unusual case and that the same enthusiasm can be traced in many other small, rural communities (see also e.g. Nielsen and Thuesen, 2002; Svendsen, 2003; Kvistgaard Consult, 2003; Thuesen and Johansen, 2005) . We might therefore conclude that, overall, a lot of social capital is actually being produced in small local rural communities in contemporary, rural Denmark. These consist of communities rich on intangible capital, including social capital, and centered around local institutions and social, cultural, and sports activities in what might be termed ''leisure-time societies'' (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004, p. 87ff.) . Indeed, the case of Skarrild not only reveals how ''lubricated'' cooperative networks are created and/or reinforced, but also how a multitude of forms of capital -''multi-capital'', if we may say so -is created at the micro level, in situ (cf. Svendsen, 2005 ). Thus we find important outcomes other than increase in people's net incomes (e.g. saving of time and money in connection with bringing yourself and your children to cultural and sports events in Kibaek), such as population increase, reinforcement of common norms and solidarity, increased human capital (e.g. knowledge about fundraising), as well as physical ''capital'' in the form of strongly including and bridging, physical meeting places, which secures regular face-face interaction and trust (as a sports hall). In sum, formation of bridging social capital in a place like Skarrild involves a wide range of long-term socioeconomic benefits, which may not be measured in economic terms in the here and now; but which nevertheless form an important part of people's everyday life and clearly enhance their well-being.
Note that there are also many recent, historical examples of socioeconomically well functioning ''leisure-time societies'' as Skarrild -small communities, which appear particularly rich on intangible forms of capital (Tomer, 2003) . These can be traced back to what has been term ''the great building of sports halls'' era during the 1960s and 1970s. This as a kind of civil self-defence (against loosing social capital and physical meeting places), at a time when almost all local cooperative associations had been shut down, among them the local parish cooperative dairies, which previously had been fabrics of social capital in rural Denmark ''by-products'' . This in contrast to two other tendencies in contemporary rural Denmark, which tend to lead to excessive bonding social capital -either due to fragmentation of associational life or due to cultural clashes between groups of agrarian minded locals and urban newcomers.
Social fragmentation due to conflicts between local people and urban newcomers is not a new phenomenon in Denmark, nor in other Western European countries such as England (e.g. Marsden et al., 1993; Woods, 1997 Woods, , 1998 , Norway (Stenbacka, 1997) , and Sweden (Kåks and Westholm, 1994) . For example, Michael Woods' (1997) study on 20th century local politics in the rural county Somerset, England, shows how an ''agricultural community discourse'' from the middle of the 1970s and onwards became increasingly conflicted with an ''environmentalist discourse'' belonging to the still more numerous and powerful newcomers from urban areas. The same kind of cultural clashes between agrarian and urban ''visions'' of the ideal way of living a rural life has taken place in rural Denmark since the 1970s (Svendsen, 2003) .
At times, these clashes appear utterly destructive, leading to generalized distrust, group isolation, and destruction of social capital. An example is the municipality of Ravnsborg, an impoverished, peripheral rural area in the northwest of the island of Lolland, which is among the 30 Danish peripheral rural municipalities mentioned earlier. Ravnsborg municipality is situated 150 km southwest of the Danish capital of Copenhagen. Since 1970, there has been a steady decrease in inhabitants, and a former rich and locally based associational life is gradually being reduced, due to lack of volunteers or, simply, because of depopulation.
Here a recent fieldwork study done by one of the authors (Svendsen, 2006) reports on serious conflicts between locals and urban newcomers, mostly relatively poor people from Copenhagen -the latter living in their own, isolated circles or, simply, without networks at all. For example, a middle aged, local man was asked, who these ''Copenhageners'' are. He answered:
They are not working people most of them. They are sort of social clients [people on public transfer incomes]. And if you go around here [in the parish] and take a look, how the houses look like -they look more and more miserable. Well, it's those people living there. Damn, it is! Such stereotypic classification tends to reinforce isolation strategies among groups of locals and newcomers and, hence, harmful bonding social capital. For example, a stigmatized newcomer and former urban dweller answered as follows, when asked if she and her husband had any contacts with the locals in the village:
It's impossible to get into contact with them [the locals], because they have their own contacts, they have their own . . . circles. They don't have any interest in getting to know us. They don't.
[They are] very suspicious (. . .) We greet each other, but that's all.
Such observations were confirmed by the local people themselves. For example, among local farmers, there were informal ''firewood supply circles'', that is, an exchange of firewood and other necessities in the winter period reserved for local people only.
In a number of cases, such distrust has led to open warfare between groups of Copenhageners and local people, often initiated by a neighbor conflict -typically concerning trifling cases such as the positioning of a carport or the height of an end wall. Concerning the carport case, the municipal employee told that, officially, 46 case reports have been filed so far and hundreds of public working hours have been poured into this rather absurd dispute.
However, trust based networks have also been established across these group cleavages, not least in the sports associations in the municipality. Thus, a newcomer from Copenhagen told that he had got to know a lot of the local people through his engagement in the local football club, etc. However, the overall impression remains that social capital is being destroyed in impoverished outskirt municipalities such as Ravnsborg. A social capital with (when one thinks about it) a surprisingly strong, socioeconomic power, and which has been accumulated since the 19th century due to voluntary civic associations such as the agricultural cooperatives. Often, this simply because of erosion of social capital in the form of people moving to the cities, not least the youngest part of the rural population.
In other parts of rural Denmark the high number of associations seems to remain, in some places also in spite of population decrease. In some areas, however, there is a significant lack of cooperation between these associations -sometimes even mutual conflict and competition, e.g. for financial support from the municipal authorities. A good example is the peripheral rural municipality of Thyholm, where a new combined sports and culture center has been built, similar to the one in Skarrild. Municipality employees initiated this project. The municipality chief executive told about ''a difficult process'', mainly because of problems with mediating between, and cooperating with, the local cultural associations in the municipality center of Hvidbjergassociations, which appeared fragmented, always being busy with digging ditches and, hence, contribute to bonding social capital formation instead of cooperating: I don't know if you know the local associational life, but we are indeed talking about rocky waters, because everybody is lying in his own trench [shooting at the others], because people believe that something is always being taken from them. They [the members of the associations] have enormous difficulties in seeing that, by giving a little, it might be possible to receive an awful lot. Therefore, it is difficult, when you have 22 associations [from Hvidbjerg involved in the culture center project], to make it all function, because: ''We don't have any interest in that!''. ''Why should we involve in that? We have our own little life here. And if a large number of people go and meet there [in the new center], then we lose something, then we lose [financial support]''. That's their worst fear. And in that way, they just sit there all of them, waiting with their riffles, metaphorically speaking.
Conclusion
Recent social capital research has been strongly influenced by Putnam's work, here not least his focus on civic engagement as a lever for economic progress. Voluntary civic associations have been seen as important tools for building social capital, beneficial for political outcomes and economic performance. As a consequence, Putnam's idea of a causal relation between civic engagement and levels of economic performance has been applied in numerous quantitative investigations, which measure social capital as the density of voluntary organizations of any type. However, so far hard evidence is lacking, which may indicate that the thing we are looking for simply is not there.
Using empirical evidence from rural Denmark, the purpose was to submit Putnam's argument to a double test -first a quantitative test (statistical data) and then a qualitative test (fieldwork).
Could, then, the assumed causal link between density of voluntary civic associations and economic performance be confirmed? The answer was no. Thus, test one revealed that association densities do not in any way influence the levels of economic performance in our Danish sample. That is, the data provides no evidence that higher association densities are positively related to higher levels of economic performance. In order to get closer to an answer to the riddle, we then changed methodology. Test two consisted in anthropological fieldwork in various outskirt communities in Denmark. These revealed that -to a large extent -voluntary associations are still hotbeds of valuable bridging social capital in rural Denmark, as was the case in a glorious 19th century ''Great era of associations'' -at a time when a large number of civic movements, including cooperative movements, were established in rural Denmark by energetic entrepreneurs. Nowadays we are prevailingly talking about intangible resources, which are not directly economically productive, or measurablein contrast to what has been hypothesized by Putnam and similar civic society optimists. These outcomes should, however, be seen as having indirect economic impact, such as can be seen in the case of the building of a sports hall in the outskirt village of Skarrild on the initiative of the locals themselves. A process, which has fostered intangible, collective resources, such as reinforcement of local solidarity and identity, common norms, knowledge about e.g. political strategies and fundraising etc. In short, a wide range of durable socioeconomic, collective goods, which in all respects are vital to people, form an important part of their everyday lives and clearly enhance their well-being. Looking at the ''downside'' of social capital, there also appeared evidence that some formal or informal, civic networks actively contribute to formation of excessive bonding social capital, which implies exclusion strategies, distrust, and lack of cooperation and hence can act as a barrier for economic development.
So we see that formation of an intangible capital such as social capital is more complex than previously acknowledged. Consequently, the power of social capitalwhich appears to be of a broad socioeconomic rather than narrow, economic nature -is not easy to measure by use of statistics only. Both positive and negative types are at play, and the often celebrated causal relation between social and economic capital is not obvious -at least not when we use the proxy of voluntary associations. Therefore, we suggest that future research should be directed towards not only the quantity of associations, but also their time-space specific qualities, in order to get a more realistic picture of their assumed blessings.
